



Director of
Central
Intelligence

~~Top Secret~~

25X1

OCPAS/CIG

CY# 285

25X1

National Intelligence Daily

Monday
9 January 1984

~~Top Secret~~

CPAS NID 84-006JX

9 January 1984


Copy

285

25X1

Page Denied

Top Secret



25X1

Contents




25X1

Chile: Terrorist Attacks Increase 4



25X1

Suriname: Cabinet Resigns 6



25X1

International: Islamic Summit 8

Special Analyses

USSR-Europe-US: Soviet Approach to CDE 9

Chad: Poor Prospects for Negotiations 12

25X1



Top Secret

9 January 1984

25X1

Page Denied

Next 3 Page(s) In Document Denied

Top Secret

25X1

CHILE: Terrorist Attacks Increase

Leftist attacks are prompting the government to adopt stronger security measures. [redacted]

25X1

The US Embassy reported 67 bombings, killings, and other terrorist actions in December. [redacted] some of these attacks are being carried out both by well-known groups, such as the Movement of the Revolutionary Left, and by Communist Party elements. Others are the work of new organizations, such as the Proletarian Insurrectional Tendency, which is preparing for prolonged armed struggle. [redacted]

25X1

25X1

In response, President Pinochet is planning to submit terrorist cases to military courts and invoke the death penalty even for terrorist acts that do not cause a loss of life. Counterterrorist strikes have been stepped up and security for senior officials tightened. [redacted]

25X1

Comment: The increase in terrorist attacks, occurring at a time of reduced political opposition activities during the summer vacation period, may be designed to deny Pinochet the breathing spell he expected. Police reaction has been restrained thus far, but declining morale and further attacks could lead to quicker and tougher police responses and provide ammunition for the opposition movement. [redacted]

25X1

25X1

Top Secret

25X1

Top Secret

25X1

Nahr al Yarmūk Drainage Basin

25X1

Top Secret

9 January 1984

25X1

Top Secret

25X1

SYRIA-JORDAN-ISRAEL: Water Dispute

Syria's growing use of water from its portion of the Yarmuk River watershed has reduced available supplies for Jordan and Israel and will aggravate the already existing water dispute between Amman and Tel Aviv. [REDACTED]

25X1

[REDACTED] Syria has built 12 dams and six smaller catchments since 1971 on tributaries of the Yarmuk, the main waterway feeding into the Jordan River. Six of the dams have been built since 1979, and two more are under construction. Syria's five-year plan for national agricultural development calls for additional dams—as well as deep wells and the expansion of associated irrigation networks—in the southern part of the country, including the Yarmuk basin. [REDACTED]

25X1

25X1

Comment: Syria's annual use of Yarmuk waters may now account for as much as half of the river's average yearly volume. About 80 percent of the river's flow originates in Syrian territory, and the Syrians eventually could draw on most of its sources. [REDACTED]

25X1

Jordan's development plans for the East Bank will be severely disrupted if the country is unable to rely on substantially more water from the Yarmuk than it currently taps. These plans already are being impeded by Amman's failure to obtain Israeli and Syrian agreement to improve existing storage and diversion facilities and build additional ones. There is little Jordan can do, however, to protect its interests.

25X1

Israel uses a small amount of water from the river for irrigation in the Al Adasiyah Triangle and stores undetermined quantities of the river's excess winter flow in Lake Tiberias. Increased Syrian water use could lead the Israelis to harden their opposition to Jordan's plans in order to protect their access to residual Yarmuk flows. [REDACTED]

25X1
25X1**Top Secret**

25X1

Top Secret

25X1

SURINAME: Cabinet Resigns

Army Commander Bouterse announced last night that Prime Minister Alibux and his cabinet have stepped down, according to press reports. The move follows reports that the regime now plans to shelve some of the proposed tax increases that originally provoked the labor crisis last month. There is no information thus far on the composition of a new government. [REDACTED]

25X1

Comment: The resignations reflect Bouterse's continuing effort to deal with the labor crisis without using force. He apparently still fears that violence could lead to US intervention. The action also will help Bouterse avoid responsibility for the current unrest by providing scapegoats. Alibux's departure, however, could enable pro-Cuban elements to regain influence in the regime. [REDACTED]

25X1

25X1

Top Secret

25X1

9 January 1984

Page Denied

Next 1 Page(s) In Document Denied

Top Secret

25X1

Members of the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC)

Note: The Palestine Liberation Organization is a member of the OIC.

ª Egypt's membership was suspended in May 1979 and Afghanistan's in January 1980.

701063 1-84

Top Secret

25X1

9 January 1984

Top Secret

25X1

INTERNATIONAL: Islamic Summit

Morocco will host the fourth summit meeting of the Islamic Conference in Casablanca beginning next Monday, with a preparatory foreign ministers' meeting to take place the end of this week. The summit will bring together representatives of Arab, African, and Asian countries. The US Embassy in Rabat reports that most of the 44 member states are expected to participate, although not all will be represented by heads of state. Iran will not attend.

25X1

Comment: The summit is unlikely to make substantial progress on the various quarrels that divide Muslims. It may be useful, however, as an opportunity for private discussions on the war in Western Sahara, PLO talks with Jordan, improved ties between Egypt and other Arab states, and other issues. Morocco's King Hassan, as chairman, almost certainly will try to organize a moderate consensus on major agenda items to be set at the foreign ministers' meeting.

25X1

25X1

Top Secret

25X1

Top Secret

25X1

Special Analysis

USSR-EUROPE-US: Soviet Approach to CDE

The Soviets will go to the Conference on Disarmament in Europe intent on emphasizing to West Europeans that they remain interested in arms control, but with no expectation of immediate substantive progress. The USSR and its Warsaw Pact allies will, in the course of the conference, try to evade commitments to provide NATO with significant additional information on Eastern military activities. The Soviets hope that Foreign Minister Gromyko's attendance at the opening session on 17 January and his meetings with Secretary of State Shultz and some of his West European counterparts will convey an impression of commitment to European security and East-West cooperation.

25X1

The USSR realizes that the Stockholm meeting has acquired additional importance since the Soviets suspended other European security negotiations. Until the USSR returns to those talks, the CDE is the only propaganda platform from which to make the Soviets' arms control case to Western publics.

25X1

Soviet media are stressing, for example, that NATO INF deployments contravene the spirit of Helsinki. Despite their avoidance of the INF issue at the CDE preparatory conference last fall, Eastern representatives probably will now try to use the CDE to undermine European support for INF and other Western security policies.

25X1

Likely Eastern Initiatives

The USSR has outlined publicly its likely proposals at the Stockholm meeting. These include:

- A nonaggression treaty between the Warsaw Pact and NATO.
- No further expansion of the two alliances.
- An agreement by the Pact and NATO that neither will be the first to use nuclear weapons.

25X1

A Soviet diplomat in Washington told US officials on Wednesday that the USSR does not itself intend to submit proposals for nuclear-weapons-free zones, as have been suggested in the past for the Nordic and Balkan regions and Central Europe. It would, however, consider formal proposals at Stockholm offered by other countries.

25X1

*continued***Top Secret**

25X1

Top Secret

25X1

In addition to such declaratory measures, the Soviets probably will propose the following confidence and security building measures:

- Prohibition of military exercises involving more than 50,000 troops.
- Lowering the current threshold for advance notification of exercises from 25,000 to 20,000 troops and extending the lead time for notification from three weeks to one month.
- Confidence and security building measures to include the Mediterranean Sea, which would require, among other things, withdrawal of nuclear-armed ships and prohibition of nuclear weapons in those Mediterranean countries in which they are not already deployed.

25X1

The Soviets have also confirmed that they do not consider the question of the geographical scope of confidence and security building measures to be closed by the language of the CDE mandate. The USSR and its allies almost certainly will reopen the issue by advocating notification of air and naval maneuvers adjacent to the European continent but independent of activities there.

25X1

As has been the case in the MBFR talks and other East-West arms control negotiations, the USSR and its East European allies will try to turn aside Western efforts at Stockholm to ensure greater access to information on Eastern military activities, capabilities, and intentions. Soviet officials have told Western contacts that "transparency" of military movements and intentions cannot be the objective of confidence and security building measures negotiated at Stockholm. The Soviets told Austrian CDE representatives in late November that, because of NATO's INF deployments, the USSR would not feel "inclined to divulge any military activities."

25X1

The Soviets have told the Austrians and other contacts that some officials in Moscow view the CDE as an "absurdity" out of tune with the current East-West situation and that they expect to achieve little of substance at Stockholm. The USSR and its East European allies nevertheless will work to convince the West Europeans of their interest in achieving CDE objectives. If the negotiations become bogged down in East-West polemics, the East will portray the impasse as the result of continued US intransigence and lack of sincere desire to promote European security.

25X1

*continued***Top Secret**

25X1

Top Secret

25X1

The Meeting With the Secretary of State

The Soviets probably agreed to the bilateral meeting between Secretary of State Shultz and Foreign Minister Gromyko primarily to avoid giving the appearance to the people of the West European countries that the USSR was rejecting an opportunity to improve US-Soviet relations. Interest in maintaining high-level communication with the US while the arms talks are in abeyance also may have been a factor. []

25X1

The Soviet leaders may hope that the bilateral meeting will dampen public concern in the USSR and some East European countries about Soviet suspension of the major arms talks. Gromyko currently plans to meet also with West German Foreign Minister Genscher, French Foreign Minister Cheysson, Italian Foreign Minister Andreotti, and British Foreign Minister Howe. []

25X1

The Soviets are likely to continue to profess, for the benefit of US as well as West European audiences, their pessimism about the prospects for improving relations with the current US Administration and particularly about the prospects for resuming arms control talks. This was reflected in a TASS statement on 31 December that disparaged the US announcement of the meeting between the two Foreign Ministers as an attempt to spread false optimism. TASS asserted that neither the CDE nor bilateral contacts can substitute for the Geneva negotiations. []

25X1

The Soviets presumably do not want the meeting with Secretary of State Shultz to degenerate into polemics and thereby provoke further deterioration in bilateral relations. They will nonetheless seek to counter any impression that the talks represent a significant reduction in the bilateral tensions brought on by NATO INF deployments. []

25X1

The Soviets do not appear to expect any major US initiative on the deadlocked arms control issues at the bilateral meeting. At the same time, there is no indication thus far that Gromyko will bring any significant new initiative of his own. []

25X1

Top Secret

25X1

9 January 1984

Page Denied

Top Secret

25X1

Special Analysis

CHAD: Poor Prospects for Negotiations

OAU-sponsored talks on Chad scheduled to begin today in Addis Ababa will try to negotiate an end to the country's four-month-old military stalemate and encourage factional leaders to reconcile. The major participants' conflicting goals probably will undermine the conference, however, or even scuttle the talks before they begin. Each side will blame the other if the meeting collapses, increasing the potential for renewed fighting and more Libyan meddling.

25X1

The conference—to be headed by OAU Chairman Mengistu, Ethiopia's pro-Libyan head of state—is the first direct meeting of the 11 principal Chadian factions since 1979. The participants will discuss OAU proposals for forming a peacekeeping force, establishing a transitional government, organizing elections, and arranging for military withdrawals from Chad by France and Libya, neither of which will take part in the discussions. Even if a dialogue proves possible, reaching agreement on a compromise candidate to head a new government in N'Djamena will be a major stumblingblock.

25X1

President Habre—who has sent to the talks a stand-in delegation led by the government's second in command, Interior and Security Minister Guinassou—probably decided not to attend for fear that Mengistu would not make good on his promise to receive the President as chief of state instead of simply as a factional leader. Habre probably hopes to demonstrate his intention to bargain in good faith while avoiding Libyan and dissident efforts to undermine his legitimacy and shift the blame to him if the talks fail.

25X1

the government will call for the return to Chad of all factions and the formation of a broad-based national leadership. Habre probably believes that, if the talks were shifted to N'Djamena, he would be able to exert greater influence over the outcome.

25X1

25X1

Libyan Intentions and French Goals

Tripoli's motives for intervening militarily last June have not changed. Libyan leader Qadhafi remains determined to consolidate control over northern Chad and install a friendly regime in N'Djamena.

25X1

The economic and political costs of continuing the current Libyan military presence in Chad appear manageable for Qadhafi. Foreign exchange reserves—helped by a more stable world oil market—

*continued***Top Secret**

25X1

Top Secret

25X1

would be more than adequate to defray the cost of such operations there if Libya's generally sound economy were to falter. [REDACTED]

25X1

In addition, military promotions and furloughs probably have eased discontent among the military personnel taking part. Qadhafi's efforts to repair relations with moderate Arab states also have largely forestalled regional criticism. [REDACTED]

25X1

Libya has acquiesced in OAU mediation efforts in hopes of undermining Habre's legitimacy and making him the scapegoat for a breakdown of the talks. Tripoli may calculate that his failure at the bargaining table will weaken French support and persuade Paris to search for an alternative leader. [REDACTED] Libya is prepared to shift its support from dissident leader Goukouni to a compromise candidate to obtain Habre's removal. [REDACTED]

25X1

25X1

The Libyans also may be trying to make a separate deal with France that at a minimum would lay the groundwork for the withdrawal of French troops and provide for a new Chadian head of state. Private talks between French and Libyan representatives are continuing, and press reports indicate that a French Foreign Ministry official visited Tripoli last week. [REDACTED]

25X1

France seeks a diplomatic solution that will permit the withdrawal of its troops without leaving the Libyans in control of northern Chad. Paris has tried to strike a balance between supporting Habre and keeping channels open to Tripoli. According to the US Embassies in N'Djamena and Lagos, French diplomats are pessimistic about the chances for successful talks. [REDACTED]

25X1

So long as French public support for the deployment in Chad remains strong, Paris probably will not make reductions in its forces there. France currently has 2,800 troops in Chad. [REDACTED]

25X1

Bleak Outlook

Negotiations are likely to be long and frustrating at best. During the process, Libya will seek to isolate Habre internationally and intensify Chadian dissident activity in the south and north. [REDACTED]

25X1

Libya may encourage the dissidents to make some limited moves into the area south of the 15th parallel—which Paris is pledged to defend—to test French resolve. [REDACTED]

25X1

25X1

*continued***Top Secret**

25X1

Top Secret

25X1

Although Paris hopes to avoid renewed fighting, it might decide to encourage Habre to take limited offensive actions to keep the pressure on Tripoli. French officials question the effectiveness of economic boycotts against Libya and worry that such actions could hurt them more than the Libyans, or could even push Qadhafi closer to the Soviets. [REDACTED]

25X1

France might seek concessions from the Libyan leader by offering to lift a de facto arms embargo that recently was imposed. The recent decision to release the last of 10 patrol boats purchased by Tripoli may be a gesture by the French to encourage Libyan cooperation. [REDACTED]

25X1

If the French conclude that Habre is an obstacle to progress, they could threaten to reduce economic and military aid to N'Djamena. Paris might even go beyond this by threatening to support some other Chadian leader. [REDACTED]

25X1

Top Secret

25X1

Top Secret

25X1

Top Secret